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SIXTH CONCURRENT CONFERENCE SESSION

A POTPOURRI OF PUBLIC FINANCE PROBLEMS

Wednesday, September 29, 1971, 9:00 a.m.

Dick Netzer, presiding.

Chairman Netzer: Although the four papers presented at this

session are indeed a potpourri in that they examine a range of public
finance problems rather than a single subject, they all deal with prob
lems that are of considerable importance both intellectually and for
informing public policy decisions. All four report on the results of

new research on topics which cry out for more research, either be
cause they have been sadly neglected in the past (payroll taxes, for

example) or because prior research has failed to address some critical

issues (as is the case with our first two papers) or because the fore
casts based on prior research appear at variance with fiscal events.
I believe that you will share my conclusion that all four make real

contributions.

The first paper deals with a topic that has caused increasing anguish
among public officials as interest rates have risen and the volume of

state-local borrowing has grown, over the past decade: municipal
bond ratings. Dr. Roy Bahl, its author, is Associate Professor of
Economics in the Maxwell School at Syracuse University. He has

done extensive research, writing and consulting on urban and regional

economics and state and local finance, both in this country and

abroad, while affiliated with the University of Kentucky, West Vir
ginia University and the International Monetary Fund.
Dr. Bahl.

(599)
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MEASURING THE CREDITWORTHINESS OF
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:
MUNICIPAL BOND RATINGS
Roy W. Bahl

Associate Professor of Economics
The Maxwell School

Syracuse University
Syracuse, New York
I. Introduction

The subject of this paper is a relatively obscure area of public
finance —the grading of state and local government bonds by th
private rating agencies. The objective here is to explore the issue o

measurement of the credit strength of state and local governments i

terms of identifying a conceptual and empirical approach. The re

vance of this exercise — at least to cities in terms of preparation of
their prospectus — is underscored by the comparative grading system

articulated by the major rating agencies. The anatomy of such an
approach is presented in the later sections of the paper. However,
the material in the two sections which immediately follow is con

cerned with the importance of ratings to state-local governments, an
with a description of the major rating systems and several proposed

alternatives.

Note that the concern here is not with the rating agencies or evalu

ation of their methods. It is, instead, with how the selling govern
ment may present a reasonable picture of its credit strength to the

market.

II. The Importance of Ratings

The issue of municipal bond ratings1 and the determinants o

these ratings has been largely ignored for most of the twenty yea
during which the major agencies have been grading municipal credi

But the fiscal crisis which has beset subnational governments

caused scrutiny of all areas of state-local finance, and the rating is
has been touched by two congressional hearings and the introductio

of bills (by Representative Patman and Senator Proxmire) whic
by producing a Federal Guarantee on State and Local Governmen

1 Throughout the paper, we will follow the terminology of rating agen
and refer to any state or local government bond as a "municipal."
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Debt, would effectively eliminate the need for a rating sy
It is not the intention in this paper to evaluate these pro

even to assess the probability that they will become fa

the view taken here is that the traditional rating system i
tive, and that it exerts a strong market effect. Reasonable

have been made that municipal ratings determine inter
ferentials. Reilly argues that the difference of a notch
may mean a difference of 25 to 50 basis points (depend
vailing market conditions).3 White's market rating of

also indicates a close relationship between quality ratings an

performance.4 Earlier research has shown a significant
between credit rating and interest costs. Roland Robins
late 1950's, found that interest costs are substantially grea
rated issues than for Aaa — given that investors compo
and maturity considerations.5 Morris found that interest c
inversely with credit ratings, when all four grades of i
security are considered, and that (median) interest rates on
bonds fall roughly between the A and BBB ratings.6 C
Phelps, in a statistical (regression) analysis, rejects the
that ratings do not influence interest costs in favor of the
that ". . . state and local governments with high credit rat
bonds at a cheaper rate than governments with a low credi
The magnitude of the rating issue has been dramatize
administrators like Roy Goodman (formerly finance admin
New York City). Goodman and his successor, Robert Wilmers,
estimate that the downgrading of New York City's bond rating from
A to BBB costs 1/4 to 1/2 of one per cent in annual interest costs,
or $1.8 to $2.5 million per year on the $500 million of new debt
floated annually by New York City.8 Given the eight-year life of the
City's average bond, this could mean up to $20 million in incremental
2 See S. 3170, 90th Congress, 2d sess., March 14, 1968; and H.R. 15991,
90th Congress, 2d sess., March 14, 1968; and Harvey Galper and John
Peterson, "An Analysis of Subsidy Plans to Support State and Local Bor
rowing," National Tax Journal, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, June 1971, pp. 205-234.
3 James F. Reilly, "Municipal Bond Ratings," State and Local Public
Facility Needs and Financing, Vol. II; Public Facility Planning, Joint Eco
nomic Committee, 1966, pp. 231-242.
4 Wilson White, Jr., White's Tax Exempt Bond Market Ratings, 1967.
5 Roland I. Robinson, The Postwar Market for State and Local Govern
ment Securities, National Bureau of Economic Research (Princeton: Prince
ton University Press, 1960), especially pp. 185-187.
6 Frank E. Morris, "The Structure of Interest Rates on Municipal Bonds,"
IBA Statistical Bulletin, July 1958.
7 Charlotte DeMonte Phelps, "The Impact of Tightening Credit on Munici
pal Capital Expenditures in the United States," Yale Economic Essays, I
(Fall 1961), pp. 289-96.
8 See "Rating Tax Exempt Securities: A Panel Discussion," The Bond
Buyer, Special Convention Issue, No. 2, June 17, 1968, p. 17.
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interest costs, or, in terms of the public sector trade-offs, hospi
space for 500 patients, seven elementary schools, or 2,000 addition
policemen.9
Given that quality ratings do determine differential interest co

there are two important implications of the ratings for the u

fiscal position. The first has to do with interest costs per se becau

of projections of unprecedented expansion of state and local ca
plants, i.e., interest costs already average a substantial fractio
urban expenditures. Moreover, higher interest costs — induce

lower ratings — will marginally distort government budget struct

by biasing decisions against debt-financed expenditures. The se
is related to the nature of metropolitan fiscal imbalance, and
nature of the differential costs which are related to credit gr
That is, in areas where public service needs are greatest (e.g.,
core cities), credit ratings are, in many cases, low. Then, ther
natural, and appropriate, counter-equalizing bias in credit rat
The counter-equalizing effect occurs because such a bias agains

poorer governments works as a partial offset against any Federal
State aids which may be designed to equalize public service levels.
Underlying these two basic factors is the premium which has n
sarily been placed on efficiency in government operations and wh
naturally leads to a search for methods to reduce governmental c
without affecting the quality of services. Viewed in this perspect

the fact that New York City is BBB instead of AAA is most

portant.
III. A Description of Rating Systems

There are essentially two kinds of municipal rating systems to

compared: (a) the partially subjective system used by the m
rating agencies, and (b) the numerical systems which would ar
at specific quantitative ratings.

Subjective Systems

In Appendix A is presented a description of the top credit gr
of each of the three major private agencies, i.e., Standard and Poo

Moody's and Dun and Bradstreet. These descriptions reveal ce
similarities. First, all are apparently concerned with the gen

economic and management strength of the urban area as well as w
its fiscal strength, though there is no definition of how specific

ures are combined to determine a credit rating. Essentially, th

the identifying feature of a subjective system, the boundaries betw

ratings of AAA, AA, etc., are not drawn on objective groun

second similarity, at least between two of the three major agenci
9 Ibid.
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is the inclusion of a statement of the market performance of the var
ous classes of securities, implying that there is some explicit connec

tion between the determination of a quality rating for a specific

government and the market preformance of that government's secur

ties. If ratings do, in fact, influence the structure of governmen
interest costs, the inclusion of market considerations in the ratin

process is clearly incorrect.

The actual method which is used to accomplish a rating may be
described in general terms. For example, Moody's description of
their process is as follows:
Bonds are usually payable in the distant future. Hence, an issue's

investment worth is gauged by the anticipated ability of its issues to meet

all debt service commitments on schedule, particularly during possible
periods of depressed economic circumstances.
The factors which must be taken into account in judging a community's
future ability to pay the interest and principal on its bonds cover the
spectrum of economic, social, fiscal, and financial data. We examine the
stability of the economic base, the relative adequacy of the community's
physical plant and municipal services in light of current and probably
near-term capital needs, the existing tax burden and the likely growth or
decline of the credit base and the impact that each of these factors has

on the others.10

Noticeable at least in this statement is the absence of objectively

defined benchmarks to enable the detection of abnormalities in certain
of the factors outlined, e.g., how high a debt burden is too high, or

what is a diversified industry structure? There is no detailed di

cussion and measurement of specific economic base characteristics, or

of reasons why certain economic base factors constitute a potentia
credit weakness. Moreover, such a method describes a number of
important factors but gives no hint as to the relative importance of

each.

Objective Systems

Of the numerical rating systems, perhaps the best known is Tyler's

rating service.11 By this method, each government is graded on

scale from 00 to 100 with 00 being the best rating. The thirty factors
considered in addition to a debt/wealth index reflect stability, growth,

10 Written statement of Robert Riehle, Vice President, Moody's Investors
Services, Inc., at hearings before the Subcommittee on Economic Progres
of the Joint Economic Committee on Financing Municipal Facilities, July 9
1968, pp. 6-7.
11 Described by Walter H. Tyler in "How Are Those Municipal Bonds
Rated?" The Institutional Investor (May 1968), p. 28; and in statement of
Walter H. Tyler, President, W. H. Tyler and Company, Inc., to the Sub
committee on Economic Progress of the Joint Economic Committee of the
Congress of the United States, July 11, 1968.
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future prospects, management, and legal position of the community

The grading involves, for example, in the case of the six growth
dicators, retail sales trends ( + 1 to -1), income trend (+2 to -2),
long-term population trend (+2 to -2), and short-term payroll trend
(+2 to -2).
Stability factors include the size of the community and the county or
metropolitan area in which it is located, diversification, unemployment,
employment in education and public administration, and college enroll
ment. Weights are generally from +2 to —2, although they may go
higher in some cases. . . .
Intangibles are military and non-white population, income distribution,
education, sound housing and any other factors the analyst may care to

include (large utility plants, etc.). The range may go as high as +4

to — 4 in some cases, but these are rare.
Management factors include the maturity schedule, current operations,
tax collections and (when available and pertinent) plant conditions,
planning, reporting, revenue exploitation, future requirements and special
considerations. In most cases, these are in the + 2 to — 2 range, but
may run higher in unusual situations.
Legal factors are tax rate limits, tax priorities, revenue priorities, etc.

The final rating is simply the debt/wealth index adjusted.12
Tyler's rating method is open to much criticism — particularly in
regard to the theoretical basis for his weights, the measurements he
uses to reflect certain factors, and some of the factors which he sees
as affecting the safety of investment in a community. But there is

much which is positive to be said about Tyler's approach to this
problem. He clearly recognizes the independence of market and

quality ratings, and, if the two diverge for a given security he sees it

as an indication that the security is a good or bad buy and not as a

reason for changing the quality rating. Second, the Tyler rating takes
the mystery out of his grading process by publicly disclosing his data,

method, and results, so that any investor disagreeing with parts of
the process may make his own adjustments. By virtue of his assign
ment of a number to each government, it becomes possible to com
pare the position of governmental units. Tyler also acknowledges the
problem of subjectivity and sees the possibility for increasing the
consistency of the ratings procedure. He notes that the subjectivity
of inconsistency may be reduced through the application of data
processing techniques to the great volume of local fiscal and socio
economic information which is compiled and published by various
governmental agencies. While Tyler's numerical grading system is
open to much criticism in terms of the relative importance of some
factors he measures, the rating agencies have much to learn from his
approach to the problem.
12 Tyler statement, pp. 4-5.
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A second system for numerically grading municipals was
by Thomas Morris in 1966.13 He sets out to (a) determine the
factors to be considered, (b) determine how to measure them, (c)
numerically value the factors, and (d) total the numerical factors to
arrive at a numerical rating. But, again, there is no strong statement
of exactly what is the credit quality desired to measure, or conceptu
ally how this quality might be impaired. Instead, Morris focuses his
attention on variables, penalizing or rewarding governments accord
ing to measured values. For example, his system penalizes an area
for having employment in service industries in excess of one-third of
total employment because . . the community becomes unduly
sensitive to this basically unproductive activity." 14 This is question
able on theoretical grounds, and would probably have the effect of
penalizing all larger cities, since city size and relative employment in
service industries are positively related.
But Morris, like Tyler, does draw attention to the possibility for
applying a more precise and systematic rating method and demon
strates that such a system can give reasonable results. He grades
28 communities with his scheme and finds quite close conformity, in
an ordinal sense, with the results reached by Standard and Poor's
and Moody's.
Quantitative Comparison
To compare the results of Standard and Poor's and Moody's rat
ings, a sample was drawn of 473 general obligation issues rated by
both agencies over the past two years. The resulting distribution of
these ratings is described in Table 1. As is shown in the last row of
this table, Standard and Poor's rates a greater percentage of issues
in the AAA, AA, and A classes, while Moody's rates a greater per
centage BBB. This pattern is observed to be true for each of the
eight population size classes considered. Both agencies seem to place
some premium on size, as evidenced by the single AAA rating among
the 231 jurisdictions with populations below 40,000. Further analysis
of these data shows that the average Moody's rating is slightly lower
than the average Standard and Poor's rating. When a larger sample
of 594 issues was examined, 372, or 67 per cent, were rated the
same by both agencies. Of those not rated equally, 90 per cent were
rated higher by Standard and Poor's than by Moody's.
To compare the rating agency's results statistically, the ratings are
assigned a numerical scale:
AAA and
AA and
A and
BBB and

Aaa = 4
Aa = 3
A =2
Baa = 1.

!3 Morris, op. cit.
14 Ibid., p. 7.
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Arithmetic means for the 473 issues show Standard and Poor's =

Moody's = 1.91. The relative variation about these means is ap

mately the same for the two agencies.
A simple correlation of dummy variables with certain measurab
factors yielded the following results: (a) There is no significant a

ciation between ratings and population size, for either agenc

Higher levels of debt burden — measures of the ratio of overlapp
debt to true valuation — are associated with lower credit ratings

both agencies; (c) Ratings are not significantly associated wit
level of per capita income or the level of per capita true valu

either agency; (d) Lower ratings are associated with higher levels
per capita overlapping debt, for both agencies; and (e) Lower rati

are associated with higher debt burden ratios, where the latt
measured as the ratio of overlapping debt to personal income

both agencies.
To examine systematic relationships between ratings and the st

ture of a city, the credit rating dependent (dummy) variable
gressed on certain independent variables which are thought t
major determinants of municipal ratings. The results of this
tiple regression, shown in Table 2, reveal that less than 25 per

in the variation in ratings can be attributed to direct and interac

effects of these variables. An analysis of covariance shows tha

ratio of overlapping debt to personal income exerts a stronger ef
on Standard and Poor's credit rating than on Moody's.

In general, this empirical comparison suggests that debt bur

measures are a major determinant of the credit rating, and does
uncover a relationship between credit rating and taxable capac
though such an effect could have been hidden by collinearity in

variables.

Summary

This comparative description should not be construed as a critique
of the agencies' approach to rating municipal bonds. To the contrary,

the "quantitative" approaches described above do not appear clearly
superior and may in the end be quite as subjective. Though a sub
jective approach does leave a great deal to be desired, a feasible al
ternative simply has not been offered.
IV. Conceptualizing the Municipal Credit Rating

One implication of all existing rating schemes is a comparative

basis, i.e., without a clear statement of whether absolute levels of
certain characteristics suggest a strength or a weakness, it follows that

judgments about strengths or weaknesses must be made in relative
terms. Then, measurements of City A's characteristics define a rating
for City A only in light of comparable measures for Cities B, C, D,
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Table 2. — Multiple Regression Equations * of Sele
a Bond Rating Dummy Variable: For 473 Issues Ra
by Standard and Poor's and Moody's
Ratio of
Over

Ratio of
Over

lapping

lapping

Per Capita

True

lapping

Constant Debt to
Personal

Population

Debt to
Value

Income

Over
Debt

Multiple
Corre

lation
Coeffi
cient

Standard
and Poor's — 0.061 *

2.982 (0.001)
-0.431

0.001*

(0.000)
0.089

-0.017*

(0.005)
-0.154

0.001

(0.001)

.4651

0.062

Moody's -0.054* 0.001* -0.015* .001
2.633 (0.012) (0.000) (0.005) (.001) .4186
-0.373 0.084 -0.139 .030

a Regression coefficients are the top number
errors are shown in parenthesis, and Beta coeffi

ber shown in each cell.

* Denotes significance at the .05 level.

etc. Before examining the possibility for developing appropriate

empirical comparisons, consider first the conceptual framework neces

sary to evaluate the credit strength of a government. Here, there
would seem two possibilities. First, one could rely on a historical

record of default and use this record as a basis for grading the quality

of municipal credit. That is, one could examine the fiscal and eco

nomic characteristics of communities which have defaulted and at

tribute a poor credit risk to any community having these characteris

tics. An alternative would be a purely conceptual statement of the

factors behind a relatively good or relatively bad credit standing. The
relatively small number of defaults on general obligation issues (There

have been more defaults on revenue bonds.) in the postwar period

leaves us without a feasible historical approach to grading the quality
of state-local government debt. The alternative, then, is to turn to a
conceptual statement of what makes some local governments better

credit risks than others. Such a model should be useful to local offi

cials in identifying their relative positions, as well as in the presentation
of their position in the bond prospectus.
Note first that a quality rating is a probability of default, and that
the aim of the rating system is to rank governments by their proba

bility of default. Market considerations play absolutely no role in
the evaluation of this probability. The municipal rating problem,
then, comes down to defining and measuring the probability of de
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fault, and ultimately the discriminator among investment grade s

ties has to do with expected future performance under altern
assumptions about the performance of the local economic bas
the local fisc. A logical and necessary place to begin articulati

this policy is with a statement of the conditions under which de

might occur. Three major causes would seem to be (a) a prolo
national recession, (b) local economic decline, apart from nat
cyclical movements, and (c) a serious fiscal crisis because of the
natural revenue-expenditure imbalance caused by (a) or (b) above,
and perhaps complicated by public mismanagement. In any case,
the question of debt burden enters as a basic factor. In grading the
relative safety of a community on these counts, several possibilities

come immediately to mind. First, in a period of recession, which
communities are apt to be most severely affected. These areas are
candidates for a higher default probability. Similarly, areas whose

economic base is secularly diminishing because of intraregional move
ments of persons and industry (e.g., many central cities), or because
their employment is concentrated in declining industries, would seem
to have a higher long-run probability of default. It is the task in the

following four subsections to explain these economic base charac

teristics in some detail and to present a measurement scheme capable
of identifying communities with these adverse characteristics.
However, susceptibility to general economic decline is only one of

the conditions necessary for default. Among the others would be

annual debt requirements which comprise a relatively large fraction
of general revenues in good times, a revenue structure which would
transmit the area's economic decline to the local fisc, and a growing

level of public service needs — particularly for welfare and educa
tional services. It should be emphasized here that the focus in this

kind of analysis is negative. That is, since the credit rating process is

essentially an evaluation of the probability of default, we are re
quired to ask how bad might the situation become under the most
trying circumstances. That is, we must completely ignore the obverse
of how good things might become under the best circumstances.
Therefore, the rating approach is pessimistic rather than optimistic
throughout this paper.
The Economic Base

Four characteristics of the community economic base which it
would seem useful to include in a credit rating model are: (a)

expected performance in a period of recession, (b) probability of local
industrial decline either because of a recession or because of the

decline of certain industries, (c) probability of long-term decline of

local economic activity, and (d) projected decline within a region,

e.g., the decline of a core city within the metropolitan region.
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The first of these would deal with the expected income loss in
community in a period of severe recession, and might be crude
measured as the per cent of labor force employed in durable ma

facturing industries, because of the relatively greater susceptibility
these industries in periods of decline. A similar statistic for tourism

related employment might be computed for certain cities. The s
ond, the probability of local industrial decline irrespective of t

overall performance of the economy, relates to the diversity of the
local employment structure. Though large cities are not one industr

towns, there are varying degrees of diversification and, therefo
varying degrees of local stability. There are alternative empiric
approaches to quantifying such urban industrial diversity.15 Th

third indicator is simply to gauge the expected long-term performan
of the local economy, on the expectation that, cet. par., those havin
expectedly low growth rates are a greater risk. The fourth measure

would abstract from the expected growth of the entire region, a
attempt to measure the possible secular decline of instability of the
government involved, i.e., it may be the case that the metropolit
region is economically healthy, but its central city is not. A co
parison of income and/or population growth rates inside and outside
the city may be useful indicators of such a pattern.
Somehow, these four economic base factors will have to be com
bined and compared among cities to derive a ranking of metropolitan
areas and specific local governments. To illustrate how such a com
parative analysis might be used to evaluate the economic base for
these purposes, these statistics may be compared for Buffalo, Dayton,
and Atlanta. It should be emphasized that these cities are chosen
for illustratory purposes only, and that data presented are neither in
sufficient detail to serve the purposes of elaborate analysis, nor cur
rent. Nevertheless, this comparison should illustrate the utility of
certain indicators for evaluating the overall "health" of an area.
Since comparative analysis requires that norms and abnormalities
somehow be established, the first three columns of Table 3 show the
average and the upper and lower deciles. The comparisons were
made for 212 metropolitan areas, and, where appropriate, for 322
cities. "High" and "low" here are defined in terms of the upper and
lower decile values respectively.
These comparisons show Atlanta to have a (relatively) diversified
employment structure, a low dependence on durable goods manufac
turing, projected growth rates in metropolitan economic activity well
above the national average, and a city population growth rate which
15 For an example, see Roy Bahl, Robert Firestine, and Donald Phares,

"Industrial Diversity in Urban Areas: Alternative Measures and Inter-Metro

politan Comparisons," Economic Geography, Vol. 47, No. 3 (luly 1971),
pp. 414-425.
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Table 3.—Selected Economic Base Indicators

Average High

Low Buffalo Dayton Atlanta

1. Percent Employed
in Durable Goods
15.00%

29.00%

34.37

19.63

Industries
2.

25.00%

33.76

60.12

11.00%

4.89%

9.44

Projections (1962
75 growth raites)
Employment

4.

25.00%

Industrial Diversifi
cation Index a

3.

—

2.9

2.32

2.26

1.15

1.6

1.4

Income

4.42

4.37

3.04

4.0

3.4

5.5

Per Capita Income

2.56

2.51

1.86

2.7

2.1

2.4

Population Growth
Rates, 1950-1960
City
SMSA

—

—

—

—

—

—

8.2
7.6
47.1
20.0

33.9

39.9

1 This index was computed by the "minimum requirements" technique.
A higher index number indicates a greater degree of specialization, and a
lower index number a more diversified employment structure. See Roy
Bahl, Robert Firestine, and Donald Phares, "Industrial Diversity in Urban
Areas: Alternative Measures and Intermetropolitan Comparisons," Economic
Geography, Vol. 47, No. 3 (July, 1971), pp. 414-425.

suggests some growth balance within the SMSA. Conversely for
the Dayton metropolitan area, these data indicate a high degree of
employment specialization and higher (than Atlanta) dependence on
durable goods manufacturing. The income and employment projec
tions for the Dayton SMSA are below average, and Dayton's core
city is growing at a rate considerably below that of the entire metro

politan area. The Buffalo metropolitan area shows a similar (to
Dayton) dependence on durable goods manufacturing, and an em
ployment diversification about equal to the national metropolitan
average. Metropolitan employment and income projections show
Buffalo to be below the national average, and the population of the

core city to be growing at a considerably lower rate than that of the
metropolitan area.

These comparisons, even if made in 1960, would be subject to
certain shortcomings, e.g., the SIC classes and aggregation chosen
may bias the results in undesirable ways, and the vulnerability of
Atlanta's economy to Lockheed's decline is not explicitly denoted.

Nevertheless, this illustration does demonstrate that even crude bench
marks might be useful in evaluating the general character of a local
economy for rating purposes.
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A comparative analysis of this type, supplemental with what

specific information about the city's economic base, is all one mig

expect of the rating agencies. Indeed, this kind of analysis inv
a great deal of effort. However, because this approach does
account for all of the peculiarities of the city, a strategy is sugge
for the city officials and/or the Bond attorneys charged with pr
ing the prospectus. Comparative statistics might be suppleme
with local knowledge of the city's economic base, e.g., heavy indu
has been moving out of the city but there is (quantifiable) evid
of in-movement of administrative employment, or sales and cons

tion in the central business district had been off for several years,

new building starts, new planned activity, and/or a downtow
newal plan point to revitalization of the CBD. In sum, the fun
of the prospectus ought to be one of anticipating the compar
analysis on the strength of the economic base and providing a

priate supporting evidence.
The Fiscal Base

It is hard to conceive of a municipal default which occurs solely

because of the performance of the local fisc — i.e., it is more realistic
to think in terms of decline in the private sector as the catalyst and
factors such as high debt burden and a relatively income elastic reve

nue structure coming into play to reinforce the situation. Other

factors which might contribute to the possibility of default under try

ing economic circumstances are: (a) a debt retirement schedule

weighted heavily in certain years, (b) a declining tax base occasioned

by the economic decline of (or decentralization within) the area, to
gether with a rising demand for public services imposed by an in
creasing amount of low income population, (c) a disposition of local
revenues which is inflexible because of substantial earmarking, and
(d) a relatively minor state government involvement in financing
welfare and education. The necessary condition would seem to be a
high debt burden, or alternatively stated, a relatively low margin of
safety. Accordingly, it would seem most appropriate to begin an
analysis of the determinants of municipal default with debt burden

considerations.

Note that the focus throughout is on the marginal contribution of
local fiscal characteristics to the probability of default, under alterna
tive kinds of adverse economic circumstances. This slant is taken
because it seems unlikely that local governments would otherwise have
difficulty meeting debt obligations. In addition to the possibilities of

cyclical and autonomous decline discussed above, the "adverse eco

nomic circumstances" condition includes the situation where there is
a question of whether forecasted levels of activity will in fact occur.

Debt Burden and the Probability of Default The probability of
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default for a municipal issue will be greater if the local government
debt burden is high, i.e., if the claim of debt retirement and interes
expenses on local tax resources reaches dangerously high proportions.

Immediately, there are three serious measurement problems: firs

which debt is to be considered; second, how is the claim of this debt
on annual revenues to be estimated and compared when there are not

readily available data on annual repayment of principal; and, third
what is a "dangerous" debt burden level.
The alternative views on the first question, which debt is relevant,
are (a) the debt of a government unit, or (b) the debt of an area
i.e., including the debt imposed by overlapping governmental jur
dictions. Both would seem important. The governmental measure
must be an important consideration because governments, and no
areas, may default on a bond; and because it does not necessarily
follow that the default of one government in an area means the
automatic default of all overlapping jurisdictions. On the other hand,
consideration of overlapping debt levels is also essential, first because
intercity comparisons in debt level must be made — i.e., since rating
are grades of relative safety, interarea comparisons are mandatory to
determine how a city departs from some average, or normal, level of
indebtedness. The complicated fragmentation of local financial r
sponsibility makes such a comparative analysis of statistics of govern
mental units per se meaningless. Yet another reason for examinin
overlapping debt is to measure the total drain on the local tax bas
therefore to generate an estimate of the potential for future deb

increments.

The problem of which debt to consider might be resolved partially
by considering both governmental and overlapping. First, the annual

retirement plus interest obligation of a governmental unit may be
expressed as a fraction of general revenues from own sources to
estimate intercity differentials in the drain on local fiscal resources.
However, governmental accounting practices and fiscal fragmentation

distort this measure badly — to a point where it may not be usable
if taken from Census sources. What is needed is a measure of that

fraction of locally collected revenues which is used to repay debt, and
to meet interest costs. These data are just not available in the needed

form. But note that, while high values of this ratio may suggest a
basically unsound debt level, it does not necessarily follow that ex
tremely low values are evidence of a strong credit condition. Low
values may, in fact, indicate a serious under-investment in public
facilities — a condition which may not be conducive to adequate

long-run growth.

The alternative to using a measure of the size of the drain on

current revenues is to use as proxy the level of debt outstanding, i.e.,
to measure the level of a government's overall debt burden. Govern
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ment finance data provide some information on the levels of govern
mental debt outstanding, but data on overlapping debt are not readily

available. There would seem two alternatives to resolving this dat
deficiency: (a) to examine SMSA aggregates as presented in the
Census of Governments, and (b) to undertake the sizeable task of

collecting and analyzing local government data.

From actual data on overlapping debt gathered on a community
by community basis, three summary indicators would seem usefu
(a) per capita overlapping debt, (b) the ratio of overlapping debt t

full property value, and (c) the ratio of overlapping debt to personal

income. TTie data presented in Table 4 show Atlanta to have

measurably higher per capita overlapping debt level than either Buf

falo or Dayton. But, when the overlapping debt level is matched

with estimated true value, Atlanta and Dayton appear relatively low
and Buffalo relatively high. These comparisons are most meaningful,
if all three cities are constrained to rely heavily on the property tax

i.e., property values would be a meaningful base against which to
compare debt outstanding. If the city relies heavily on more elast

non-property tax revenues, the debt-property value ratio overstates th
comparative debt burden. There are numerous other qualifying state

ments to include in the city prospectus. Two examples are the pr

sentation of the maturity schedules of the actual issues to demonstrate

the nature of the time drain on local resources, and the natural e
pansion of the property tax base to project rises or declines in th

debt-property value ratios.

Revenue-Expenditure Imbalance Nearly all metropolitan central

city governments currently face the serious problem of a growing im

balance between expenditure needs and tax resources. On the need
side, core cities are receiving an increasing fraction of low-incom

families in general, including non-whites, the elderly, and the unem

ployed. To accentuate the core city needs further, a great mass o

daytime commuters to work and to shop must also be provided with

public services. On top of these kinds of pressures, there are de
mands for increased wage rates for public services employees and
increased fringe benefits. On the resources side, the low-incom

population certainly adds less to the revenue base than to expenditure

requirements. Also, depending on the rate and base structure of
local revenues, core city governments may not be compensated ad

quately by non-resident users.
The seriousness for municipal bond ratings of a prognosis of heavy

expenditure pressure may be evaluated only in light of the loca
revenue structure. If a declining core city is almost completely de

pendent on the property tax, its ability to meet debt obligations over

the long run may be seriously impaired. On the other hand, sub
stantial reliance on more broadly based non-property taxes may en
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hance the adequacy of the core city fisc if the outlying p
the SMSA is growing. If a local occupational or sales tax is

a proportion of the wealth of non-core city residents may be

to support central city services, though, even here, the co
long-term decentralization of industry and retail activity
mately deplete the non-property tax base. A final possibili

stantial reliance on an area-wide revenue base distributed on some

needs basis. This conceivably would tie local revenues to the re

sources of the entire metropolitan area and not to the declining core
city base. This latter financing arrangement may lessen the long-run
default probability of a declining central city as much as any purely
local fiscal policy. The specifics of the urban revenue structure, and

any indication of how city taxes reach beyond the city tax base,

should always be an integral part of the prospectus.

From Table 3, it might be argued that Dayton and Buffalo are

experiencing greater central city decline than is Atlanta, though the

city of Atlanta has a lower income level and a greater per cent of
the population with incomes below $3,000. More detailed city
suburb comparisons might be used to determine whether there is a
trend toward increasing intra-metropolitan imbalance. At any rate,
a superficial look at the data suggests that all three have the charac

teristics of the stereotyped declining core city. On the revenue side,
Buffalo relies on the local property tax to a much greater extent than

does either Dayton or Atlanta. The State of Georgia improves

Atlanta's fiscal strength by assuming nearly all financial responsibility

for welfare and a fairly large share for education. Dayton's fiscal

strength is not supported to the same extent by the State of Ohio's
posture toward education and welfare.

Long-term Revenue Stability and Adequacy The possibility for
default may be increased if, in the long run, the local revenue base
proves to be inadequate by failing to expand with increasing expendi
ture needs. If the local government is dependent to a great extent on
the property tax, the long-term growth in revenues may not be ade
quate to meet the needs of, for example, a large central city. On the
other hand, a growing bedroom suburb might find the property tax
to be an adequate long-term source of revenue. Then, the long-term
adequacy factor as it relates to the local revenue structure may be
evaluated only in light of the characteristics of the governmental unit
in question.
A second feature of the local revenue structure which has been

considered relevant for purposes of municipal rating is that of revenue

stability. Specifically, the question is how will the local fiscal base
perform in a period of economic decline, i.e., will it magnify or

dampen the decline in transmitting it from the private to the public

sector? If heavy reliance is placed on the income-elastic sales and
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income taxes, a sustained decline in economic activity could affect

tax collections by a substantial amount. Alternatively, the property

tax shows the most stable yield in a period of recession, therefore

governments relying heavily on the property tax will probably fare
best. But, again, it does not follow that property taxes are conducive
to greater long-term stability in all types of communities. The kind

of tax structure which is most conducive to long-run adequacy of
local fiscal resources is another question which cannot be answered
apart from a consideration of the type of governmental unit being

examined.

The position here is that the cost, in terms of revenue growth, of

relying heavily on the property tax is high. All other things being
equal, a core city undergoing long-term decline would seem to be a

relatively higher risk if it relies heavily on the property tax.
Revenue Flexibility Inflexibility in the revenue structure may also
contribute to a higher probability of default. If there is a substantial
earmarking of local receipts, the potential for transferring funds to
meet the most pressing needs is limited. A second factor which may
reduce the flexibility of local revenue systems is the rapid growth of

revenue bonds. The dedication of local revenues to meeting these

liabilities substantially increases the rigidity of local revenue systems.

Revenue Base Diversity Some smaller suburban governments face

the problem of a relatively few taxpayers accounting for a substantial
proportion of total local receipts. In this situation, the potential for
local fiscal decline is relatively great. If a few large firms comprise
a relatively high fraction of assessed value or property tax receipts,
local revenues may be only as stable as these firms, and the safety of

principal and interest may be less than in the presence of a more

highly diversified tax base. In addition, a suburb with such tax base

concentration will perform poorly during periods of prolonged re
cession, and will have fiscal base more susceptible to autonomous

local fiscal decline.

Intergovernmental Assistance and Revenue Adequacy The long

term adequacy of local government revenues may not be properly

evaluated without consideration of state and federal assistance pro
grams, for intergovernmental revenues are playing an increasingly
important role in the financing of modern urban government. In

fact, the most important element in the fiscal health of Central Cities

may well relate to the intergovernmental dimension. Many would

hold that the key to the fiscal future of American cities lies in the

resolution of their problem of providing for the poor and for the

children, and the American experience over the past decade suggests
that at least one potential solution to these problems involves increas
ing reliance upon state government.
There are two general ways in which state government might affect
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the credit rating of local governments by affecting the adequacy

its local fisc. First, direct state assistance (either through a g

program or transfer of function) should be a major consideration

evaluating the fiscal health of local governments, for intergo

mental revenues average about 30 per cent of locally raised city g

ernment revenues. State and federal financial assistance is a vital

consideration in evaluating the debt repayment potential of local

governments. This is an especially important consideration for those
core cities which are experiencing a strong upward pressure on local
expenditures. In such cases, continued state and federal participation
in local finances strengthens the local fiscal position. In states where
the welfare function has been directly transferred to the state govern
ment, or where primary financing responsibility has been assumed by
the state, the prognosis for core-city fiscal adequacy is considerably
brighter. During periods of declining economic activity, requirements

on the paying government for public assistance payments increase,
and, if tax receipts are also down, the city's fiscal position could

become precarious. However, if welfare is a state function, much of
the cumulative financial pressure is shifted from the city to the gen
erally more affluent state government with its broader tax base. The

transfer of function option also enables the city to avoid the high
drains on the local budget in more prosperous times, since labor
shortages have, in past years, attracted great numbers of the low

income and unskilled to the larger urban areas.

The second opportunity for state government to raise the credit
rating of its local governments is to create a general atmosphere

which is conducive to efficient local government debt management.

The ACIR points out that, in several states, especially those with

detailed constitutional provisions for local debt, existing law as it has
been judicially interpreted tends to remove or bias the choice of local
governments among alternative kinds of long-term borrowing.16 The
lack of clear definitions of debt, together with existing state provisions
that make popular referendum a mandatory condition for the issuance

of full faith and credit obligations, has stimulated the creation of

additional special districts and financing authorities. In general, these
restrictions on local government have spawned expensive borrowing
practices.

The ACIR makes four suggestions as to how state government

might increase the efficiency of local government borrowing and debt
practices:
1. Authority to issue bonds should be legally vested in the governing
16 Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, State Consti
tutional and Statutory Restrictions on Local Government Debt (September
1961), pp. 71-73.
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bodies of local governments, subject to a permissive legislation on
on petition, and with participation in any such referendum availa
to all eligible local voters and the results determined by a simp
majority vote on the question.
2. Constitutional and statutory provisions limiting local government
or debt service by reference to the local base for property taxa
should be repealed.
3. States should consider measures to regulate long-term borrowin
local governments by reference to the net interest cost or prospec
bond issues in relation to the currently prevailing interest rate
high quality municipal securities.
4. States should make available technical and advisory assistance to
local governments with regard to the issuance of long-term debt; and
the state agency responsible for this function should be empowered
to prescribe the minimum content of official statements prepared by
local governments in connection with their issuance of long-term
debts, in order to provide prospective investors with data needed to
evaluate the security offerings.17

At least the first three of these factors might be included as sub
jective factors which have a positive influence on the credit rating.
V. Conclusions

This paper is addressed to state and local officials charged w

developing a statement of a government's credit strength. The int

tion is to develop a general conceptual and comparative empi
framework which might suggest the material which should be

sented in the prospectus.

Note that the illustrative comparative analysis of 1960 econo
base and fiscal statistics presented above does not provide a qu

tative municipal rating system. To do so, these data would someho
have to be combined to derive a single comparative measure for ea
government. At this point in time, it does not seem possible to ca

the quantitative analysis to that extreme because of the many

jective factors which must be considered. For example, if a declini
core city and a heavy dependence on the property tax may be qua
tatively documented, it remains to consider how the state govern
will intervene on behalf of the city via grants-in-aid or direct ass

tion of responsibility for welfare and education. However, th

would seem to be room to develop a set of indicators, along the lin
described above, which would be useful in substantiating an argum
as to the comparative economic and fiscal health of governments.
Nevertheless, every attempt at quantification of the relevant fact
should be made. City governments should rethink their old metho
of presenting their credit strength to the market — the opportu
costs of not doing so may be very high indeed.
" Ibid., pp. 72-82.
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Appendix A

Bond Rating Definitions
Standard and Poor's

AAA-Prime — These are obligations of the highest quality. They
have the lowest probability of default. In a period of economic

stress the issuers will suffer the smallest declines in income and will

be least susceptible to autonomous decline. Debt burden is not
inordinately high. Revenue structure appears adequate to meet
future expenditure needs. Quality of management would not

appear to endanger repayment of principal and interest.

AA-High Grade — The investment characteristics of bonds in this
group are only slightly less marked than those of the prime quality

issues. Bonds rated AA have the second lowest probability of

default.

A-Upper Medium Grade — Principal and interest on bonds in this

category are regarded as safe. This rating describes the third

lowest probability of default. It differs from the two higher ratings
because there is some weakness, either in the local economic base,
in debt burden, in the balance between revenues and expenditures,

or in quality of management. Under certain adverse circum
stances, any one such weakness might impair the ability of the

issurer to meet debt obligations at some future date.

BBB-Medium Grade — This is the lowest investment grade security

rating. Under certain adverse conditions, several of the above
factors could contribute to a higher default probability. The dif

ference between A and BBB ratings is that the latter shows more
than one fundamental weakness, whereas the former shows only
one deficiency among the factors considered.1
Moody's
Aaa — bonds with the smallest degree of investment risk; interest

payments are protected by large or by an exceptionally stable
margin, and principal is secure; changes in various protective ele
ments are most unlikely to impair the fundamentally strong posi

tion of such issues.

A a — high quality of all standards but rated lower than best bonds
because of lower margins of protection, greater amplitude of fluc
tuations of protective elements, or some other elements which make
the long-term risk appear somewhat larger than on the best bonds.
1 Standard and Poor's Corporation, Municipal Bond Selector (New York:
Standard and Poor's Corporation, 1971), p. 2.
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A — higher medium-grade obligations with adequate factor
security to principal and interest but with elements presen
suggest a susceptibility to impairment sometime in the futu

Baa— lower medium-grade bonds which are neither hig

tected nor poorly secured; interest payments and principal
adequate for the present, but certain protective elements m
lacking or may be characteristically unreliable over any grea

of time.2

Dun and Bradstreet

Prime Grade: These situations exhibit more or less uniformly
strong characteristics with respect to all basic credit factors and
are lacking in significant unfavorable characteristics. Bonds of
this group are assumed to involve the least risk of nonpayment or
delay in payment.
Better Good Grade: These situations, while inherently strong, fail
to meet requirements for PRIME GRADE credit quality, normally
because they exhibit some characteristic which, while sub-standard,
is amply offset by other factors.

Good Grade: These situations measure up to prevailing standards

as to the majority of basic credit factors and are lacking in signifi

cant weaknesses. The odds in favor of continuity of debt service
payments are high.
Better Medium Grade: These situations exhibit elements that fall

short of meeting GOOD GRADE standards, but the elements of

strength present on the whole outweigh any significant weaknesses.
The odds comfortably favor continuity of debt service payments.
Medium Grade: These situations exhibit elements that fall short of

average performance and have weaknesses that in at least some

respects exceed acceptable levels. Security of principal is regarded
as good, but interruption of payments could occur under sufficient
pressure.

Lower Medium Grade: These situations are sub-standard as to the

preponderance of basic credit factors, but other factors must be
considered and such situations may work out without interruption
of debt services. The group contains elements of speculation.
Marginal Grade: These are distressed situations, or situations exhib
iting significant weaknesses such that continuity of debt service pay
ments is dependent on a fortuitous combination of circumstances
which cannot reasonably be expected to continue indefinitely.
2 Moody's Investors Service, Inc., Moody's Municipal and Governmental
Manuals (New York: Moody's Investors Service, Inc., 1968), p. VI.
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Default: These situations are in default as to interest, principal,

both on the class of bonds under study. Ordinarily, an appr

of the credit prospects will depend on clarification of the situati
including development of proposals to cure the default.3

3 Thomas E. Morris, "Municipal Bond Ratings — Perspective, Evalua
and Improvements" (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, Institu
Investment Banking, 1966), p. iii.

Chairman Netzer: Our second paper takes up a subject of lon
and obvious interest to policy-makers, the burden of state-loca
systems by income class. Over the years, there has been a good
of research on the subject; in this generation, most of the res
has been in the form of adaptations of an approach developed
Professor Richard Musgrave and published in the National Tax
Journal twenty years ago. Nearly everyone who has done research
on the topic is dissatisfied with his own results — and most emphati
cally so in my own case — and with policy-makers' perceptions of
the realities. The paper before us presents a new approach, which
overcomes some of the most serious deficiencies in the analyses done
heretofore. Its author, Dr. Donald Phares, is Assistant Professor of
Economics at the University of Missouri — St. Louis, and Staff Econo

mist at the University's Center for Community and Metropolitan
Studies. He did his graduate work at Syracuse University and has

written on a variety of issues in urban economics and state-local

finance.
Dr. Phares.
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